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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. CORAY;Ancilliary Ad-
ministrator of the Estate of V\Til-
liam Frank Lucus, Deceased, . 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY,-
a corporation, · 
D.efendan.t and Re_spon.dent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
~ . ~. 
Case No. · 
7382 
=.:.~ :- ,: . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The first trial of this case resulted in a directed 
verdict for ·defen.dant, which was affirmed by . the Su-
preme court of Utah, and reversed by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. That court held the question of 
whether the death of Lucus was caused in whole or in 
part by the failure of the triple valve on the air line 
was a jury question. The second trial was, before a jury 
which returned a verdict of no cause of action. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant did not contend in the trial court that he 
was entitled to a directed verdict. He ·does not contend 
in this court that there is no testimony to support the 
verdict. The contention of Appellant's brief is there 
was error below in the instructions and failure to in-
struct, and in the introduction of evidence. Mr. Lucus, 
the deceased, was traveling east on a motor track car 
which he was operating and looking west when he ran 
into the rear end of a freight train which had stopped 
on the track. He was killed. The train had stopped 
because a nut on a valve in the air line had become dis-
connected. This caused the brakes on all the cars of 
the train to be applied, and stopped the train just the 
same as if the engineer had applied the brakes in emer-
gency or full application. The train ran between thirty 
~)and forty car lengths before stopping after the brakes 
were applied. This would be from 1500 to 2000 feet. 
(Tr. 71). The brakes on the track ·car were in good con-
dition, and would stop the car- in 100 feet going thirty-
five miles an hour. (Tr. 138). The deceased Lucus was 
going to deliver some pay checks to railroad employees 
who lived at various stations east of Lemay, the point 
where he placed the car on the track. Alvin Lynch an-
other employee was going to relieve· Lucus as signal 
maintainer a.t Lemay, and he was ridin·g on the car at ihe 
time of the accident to become familiar with the territory. 
Lucus had no duties to _perform except to operate the 
motor car. Lucus and Lynch were not talking to each 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
other. As the n1otor car approached the stopped train, 
it was going fron1 ten to twenty-five miles an hour. (Tr. 
22). It is undisputed that Lucus did not apply the 
brakea of the track car prior to the collision. Lucus 
and Lynch both kne'v the freight train was only three 
or four hundred yards ahead of them on the track. (Tr. 
19). They placed the track car on the main track after 
waiting for the eastbound freight train to pull out 
ahead of the1n. The car was built for one man operation 
and Mr. Lucus was the operator. (Tr. 20). 
The suit was brought on behalf of the widow of 
Frank Lucus, who was about ten years ol~er,~,_than he. 
There were no children. Mr. Lucus brought a suit 
against Mrs. Lucus for divorce in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, where the parties were then living, in August, 
1942. Mrs. Lucus filed a cross-complaint for separate 
maintenance. A photostatic copy of her Cross-complaint 
is in the record as defendant's Exhibit 2. The court 
made an order on January 6, 1943, allowing Mrs. Lucus 
$10.00 a week as .support money. Mrs. Lucus never 
saw or heard from him again during his life. He waf? 
killed in May, 1944, in western Utah. He never paid 
anything on the support money. FUrther facts in regard 
to defendant's claim that Mrs. Lucus lost nothing by 
the death of her husband are stated in ·connection with 
the argument on that point. 
Because appellant claims there was reversible error 
In the instructions, it is important to learn what. the 
court told the jury. 
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Instruction No. 2 told the jury that the defendant 
was operating a freight train containing a defective 
car in that the triple union nut became disconnected 
and allowed the air pressure to escape and set the 
brakes and forced the train to come to an abrupt and 
sudden stop. That William Frank Lucus, who was fol-
lowing the train on a motor car, did not observe the 
freight train had stopped, and as a result the motor 
car crashed into the rear end of the freight train, and 
Lucus received fatal injures from which he died. The 
court told the jury that the defendant claims the negli-
gence of Lucus was ''the sole proximate cause'' of his 
'death. 
In Instruction No. 5 the court told the jury that, 
''The defendant was guilty of a violation of 
the Federal Safety Appliance Act, and if you 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
such violation proximately caused, in whole or 
in p·art, the death of William .Frank Lucus, then 
you should return a verdict' in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant and award to 
plaintiff damages as in these instructions set 
forth. 
"You are instructed that under the pro-
visions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act if 
a violation of such a:ct by a common carrier by 
rail in inter-state commerce contributes to the 
death of one of its employees then such employee 
cwnno·t be held to have been guilty ·Of cDntributory 
negligence.'' 
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The last paragraph of the foregoing Instruction 
No. 5 is a.n exact copy of the first paragraph of ap-
pellant's requested Instruction No. 4. The first para-
graph of the foregoing Instruction No. 5 is a copy of 
a portion of the last paragraph of appellant's requested 
Instruction No. 3. ( Tr. 208). 
The jury \Yas instructed that the parties to the action 
were engaged in interstate commerce, and plaintiff's 
right to recover based on the federal statutes .and the 
statutes of Utah relating to Workmen's Compensation 
do not apply. 
The appellant's requested Instruction No. 10 (Tr. 
208) asked for the usual and standard instruction on 
the measure of damages which Mrs. Lucus sustained 
as a result of the death of her husband. That request 
was given ·as Instruction No. 11. 
Appellant assigns as error the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 11, which reads 
as follows: 
"You are instructed that the marriage re-
lation creates a right on the part of the wife 
to be supported by her husband and this right 
may he legally enforced by her so long as the 
marriage relation exists, and if the said Edith 
B. Lucus is entitled to recover damages under 
these instructions she cannot be dep:rived of 
that right by a :plea on the part of defendant that 
her husband had not fulfilled the duties he owed 
to her. 
''In this connection you are instructed that · 
if you find that plaintiff is entitled to recover 
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da1nages in this case then in deter1nining the 
loss of pecuniary benefits mentioned in Instruc-
tion No·------------· (Here insert the number of the 
Court's instruction which corresponds with plain-
tiff's requested Instruction No. 10.) You may 
take into consideration not only such voluntary 
contributions as 'Villiam Frank Lucus may rea ... 
sonably have been exp~ected to make to Edith B. 
Lucus during her lifetime but also such contri-
butions as she may reasonably have been expected 
to secure through the enforcement of her legal 
right to support from her husband." 
Appellant objects to the giving of Instruction No. 
9, which reads as follows: 
''You are instructed that the mere fact that 
Edith Lucus was the legal wife of Frank Lucus 
at the time of his death is not sufficient evidence 
to prove that the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
any damages for his death in this action. If 
you believe from all the evidence in the case 
that the deceased would not have made any fur-
ther money contributions to Edith Lucus or 
would not have supported her in the future if 
he had not died, then your vetdict should be for 
the defendant.'' 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL . COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENICE WAB. A DE-
FENSE AND PROPERLY SU·BMIT·TE·D THE ISSUE OF 
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
At p·age 39 of ap·pellant 's brief, it is said: 
''The contention of defendant that an issue 
of sole proximate cause is made is pure and 
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• 
sin1ple subterfuge and n1ade for the purpose of 
breathing life into a defense which has been ex-
pressly elinrinated not only by the Federal Con-
gress but the :Supreme Court of the United States 
in thi~ very case.'' 
Let us pause at the outset to ask, if there 'vas no 
issue of sole proximate cause in the case, what was the 
issue for the jury¥ There was no dispute that the train 
stopped, because of a failure of the air line which caused 
an emergency stop. Appellant requested the court to 
submit to the jury th·e issue of sole proximate cause in 
his request No. 3. The issue there requested by appel-_ 
lant is that if the stopping of the train ''proximately 
caused in whole or in part'' the death of Lucus, then 
· · the verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff. One may 
not object on appeal to a ruling of the trial court that 
was invited by the appellant. 
In his summary of the Argument appellant at page 
6 of the brief states : 
''The court prejudicially instructed the jury 
that if deceased was guilty of contributory negli-
gence his negligence was a complete bar to re-
covery." (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, and 3). 
This assertion is not supported by the record. In 
Instruction No. 16 the jury was told that if Lucus chose 
an unsafe position on the motor car when a safe posi-
tion was equally available to him, he was negligent 
and if such negligence was the ''sole proximate cause'' 
of deceased's injuries, then the verdict should be for 
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defendant. That instruction further told the jury that 
the burden was on defendant to prove that the negligence 
of Lucus, if any, was the sole proximate cause of his 
death. To attempt to say this instruction told the jury 
that if deceased was guilty of eontributory negligence, 
his contributory negligence was a complete bar to re-
covery is a bald misconstruction of the language used. 
To show further how far apellant has departed 
from the facts of the record in this regard, it is neces-
·sary to refer to the last paragraph of Instruction No. 
5 which we again quote: 
"You are instructed that under the provi-
sions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act if a 
violation of such act by a common carrier by 
rail in inter-state commerce contributes to the 
death of one of its employees then such employee 
cannot he held to have been guilty of contributory 
negligence.'' · 
The court in Instruction No. 5 as requested in appel-
lant's request No. 3 instructed the jury that defendant 
was guilty of a violation of the federal law and also that 
if a violation of such act contributes to the death of one 
of its employees then such employee ''cannot be held 
to have been guilty of contributory negligence.'' The 
instruction was the verbatim product of appellant's 
request designed and worded and intended to make it 
clear to the jury that contributory negligence was no 
defense. But in spite of the fact that the court told the 
jury as requested by a.pp,ellant that contributory negli-
gence was no defense, we find appellant's brief in the 
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su1nn1ary erroneously telling this court that the trial 
court instructed the jury that contributory negligence 
'' "yas a complete bar to recovery.'' Even without the 
aid of the 'vell-kno"yn rule that the instructions must be 
considered together, there is no basis in fact for the 
assertion of the sun1mary. 
The cases fron1 the Supren1e Court of the United 
States relied on by appellant do not hold there was 
any error in the instructions to the jury or in the ad-
mission of evidence in the Coray case. 
Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Lilndsay, 233 U.S. 
42, 58 L. Ed. 838 (1914), the plaintiff below obtained a 
verdict in the trial court which was affirmed in the 
Seventh Circuit Court of appeals, and also in the Su-
preme Court. The Railway Company moved for a di-
rected verdict which was denied and it appealed in both 
upper courts. The assignment of error considered by 
the Supreme Court was the refu8al to direct the ver-
dict for defendant below. It appeared that Lindsay was 
hurt while trying to couple two cars, one of which had 
a defective coupler. The trial court had told the jury 
that if Lindsay had done something carelessly which 
had proximately contributed to the accident., he could 
not recover. The Supreme Court quotes with approval 
from the decision of the Circuit Court that, 
"It is only when plaintiff's act is the sole 
cause- when defendant's act is no part of the 
causation - that defendant is free from lia-
bility under the act.'' 
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We submit that in the Co ray case the jury was not 
instructed that contributory negligence was a defense. 
They were told directly to the contrary. In the Lindsay 
ca.se the jury had found that the negligence of the rail-
road in having the defective car in use was one of the 
causes of the accident. The jury in the Coray case found 
that the negligence of the railroad in having the defective 
air line in the train was not one of the causes of the 
accident. 
The jury in the Coray case was not told that con-
tributory negligence was a complete or any defense. 
Spokane & lnl;a.nd EmpiJre Railroad Co. v. CampbeU, 
241 U.S. 497, 36 S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125, the plaintiff 
below (Camp·bell) obtained a verdict which was af-
firmed on appeal. The ;Supreme Court held the jury 
must have found that the defective air brakes were ''a 
proximate cause of the collisi,on. '' The employee had 
left Coeur d'Alene westbound in violation of his orders. 
He collided with a train on the same track moving east-
hound. There was evidence that he saw the approaching 
train, and if the air brake·s had worked, he could have 
stopped his train in time to have avoided the collision. 
The court held that where "plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence and the defendant's violation of a provision of the 
Safety Appliance Act are concurring proximate causes, 
it is plain that the Employer's Liability Act requires 
the former to be disregarded.'' 
The rule of the. Campbell case was apparently em-
bodied in ap·pellant's request No. 4, and was given in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Instruction No. 5 in 'vhich the jury was told that if a 
violation of the Safety .i\ppliance Law contributes to the 
death, then the employee cannot be held guilty of con-
tributory negligence. We are unable to see anything 
in the Can1pbell case which shows error in th·e instruc-
tion in the Coray case. The jury in the Campbell case 
held for the plaintiff, and the jury in the Coray case 
held for the defendant. The instructions of the trial 
court in the latter case do not conflict with the law of the 
Campbell case. The defendant's contention in the Camp-
bell case to which the Supreme Court devoted its atten-
tion was that it was entitled to judgment not withstand-
ing the general verdict for Campbell. The jury found 
specially that the violation of his orders by Campbell 
when he left Coeur d'Alene was the proximate cause of 
the accident, but also returned a general verdict for the 
plaintiff. The Supreme Court said ''the jury must have 
found that the defective air brakes were a proximate 
cause of the collision.'' The jury in the Co ray case 
must have found that the failure of the air line on the 
train did not cause ''in whole or in pa~t '' the death of 
Lucus. The rule of law announced in the Campbell case 
was correctly embodied in the instructions to the jury 
in the Coray case. 
Chicago Gre~at Western Railroad Company v. Schen-
del, 267 U.S. 287, 45 S. Ct. 303, 69 L. E·d. 614. The em-
ployee was killed while working on a car with a defec-
tive ·drawbar. He was between two cars to disengage a 
connecting chain used becaus-e of the defective drawbar. 
The engineer was not told he had gone between the cars. 
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The engine was disconnected and the car adjacent to 
the en1ployee moved and caused his death. The jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant con-
tended that the car had come to rest on the sidetrack and 
had ceased to be "used" as contemplated by the act. 
The court ·held the use of the ·defective car had not 
ended. No instruction to the jury is discussed. It is 
significant that the trial court permitted the defendant 
to prove the violation of the safety rule, which provided 
that employees should advise the engineer when they 
were going between or under cars. Appellant presum-
ably relies upon the Schendel case to show that the con-
tributory negligence of the employee did not prevent the 
case from going to the jury. Neither did contributory 
negligence prevent the Coray case from going to the 
jury. The jury was told the plaintiff could not be held 
to have been _guilty of ·contributory negligence if a 
violation of the act contributes to the death. The jury 
found, by its general verdict for defendant, that the vio-
lation of the act did not contribute to the death. 
Scrimo v. Central R.R. of New Jersey, et al, 138 
F. (2d) 761. In the Scrimo case the court below ad-
mitted in evidence the safety rules of the company just 
as they were admitted in the Coray case. The deceased 
was engaged in a switching operation and was found 
dead under the wheels of a car on which there was a 
defective coupling device, warranting the inference that 
deceased stumbled when attempting to ji_ggle the lock 
pin of the defective coupling. The rule that contributory 
negligence is not a defense if violation of th·e Safety 
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~\ppliance ..~.\ct contributes to the death stated in the 
Scrin1o case is the rule which the court gave~ in its in-
structions in the Coray case. 
Palzon L". Lehigh Valley R. Co., 165 F. (2d) 3. Here 
the plaintiff employee obtained a verdict which was 
affirmed on appeal. He was a fireman hit by a low 
bridge \vhile going on top of the tender to measure the 
water. The court held that the question of whether 
the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cauae of his in-
juries was a jury question. There was e·nough evidence 
of negligence of the defendant in using the fireman on a 
part of the line he had never been over before to support 
submission to the jury under the ''recent decisions'' 
of the Supreme Court of the United States. We find 
difficulty in seeing the relevancy of this Palum case to 
the case at bar. No que-ation of the propriety of instruc-
tions was involved. If the trial court in the Coray case 
had granted a directed verdict for the defendant as in 
the prior trial, the Palum case is authority for the con-
tention that it should goi to the jury. 
The Palum case contains the following discussion 
of the case of Willis v. Pernn. R. Co., 122 F.(2d) 248, 
(Certiorari denied 314, U.S. 684, 62 S. Ct. 187, 86 L. Ed. 
547.). 
''The defendant argues that the decision 
of this court in Willis v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 
should have controlled the trial judge in the case 
at bar and that it required the direction of a 
verdict for the defendant on the ground that 
plantiff's conduct in leaving the cab in disregard 
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of the rule and failing to observe the low bridge 
in time to prevent being hit was the sole cause of 
his injury. But Willis v. Pennsylvania R. Co. may 
be distinguished on the ground that the only 
duty of the plaintiff there was to 'vatch and if he 
had watched the injury to him would not have 
happened. Here a duty of the plaintiff was to 
see that there was sufficient water in the boiler 
and it was in attending to the performance of that 
very duty, albeit with negligence in one aspect 
thereof, that he sustained the injury. It is not 
certain that if he had notified the engineer that 
he was going to leave the cab in order to sound 
the ta.nk that he would have been warned against 
the low bridge for it is entirely possible that the 
engineer would have expected him to look out 
for himself and to watch for such a danger as 
he encountered. What the plaintiff seems to have 
done was to have failed to he watchful enough 
for obstacles as well as to have forgotten to notify 
the engineer that he was going to leave the cab. 
We think the inadvertent neglect to observe the 
rule, while probably an act of contributory negli-
gence to be considered by the jury in reduction 
of his damages, was not a bar to his claim.'' 
We believe the Palum case shows there was a ques-
tion of sole proximate cause in the Coray case, because 
it is undisputed from the record that Lucus like Willis 
had no duty other than to watch as he rode along the 
track on the motor car. He was going to deliver pay 
checks to emp1loyees east of Lemay. 
In the Willis case (supra.) three ·signal maintainers 
were working on a switch in the classification yard. 
There was a long standing custom, with which all em-
1 
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ployees 'vere familiar, for switching to be continued 
'vhile track repair w·ork \Yas being performed and for 
the repair gang to protect themselves by having one of 
their number act as lookout and give warning of ap-
proaching cars. Willis was acting as lookout when a 
moving car hit and killed him. The Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Willi.s' neglect 
of his duty to act as watchman was the ''sole cause'' 
of his ovvn death, and that even since the recent amend-
ment of 45 U.S.C.A. Section 54 excluding assumption of 
risk as a defense, an employee cannot recover for in-
juries resulting solely from his own fault. The Willis 
case held the trial court properly directed the verdict 
for the defendant. 
If the question of ''.sole cause'' in the Willis case 
was one of law, it is obvious that the question of "sole 
cause'' in the Coray case was one of fact in view of 
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United -States. 
In fact, that is what the U.S. Court held as shown by 
the Quotation from the opinion in appellant's brief at 
page 25. The last sentence reads : 
''The jury could, have found that decendent 's 
death r-esulted from any or all of the foregoing 
circumstances.'' 
This means the ~s.uJJireme Court held there was a jury 
question of causation. The jury in the case, under p-ro-
per instructions, held the death resulted solely from the 
negligence of Lucus. 
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The Supreme Court in Johanna Frese, admx. v. 
Chicago Bu.rlington ·wnd Qu.incy Railroad Compan;y, 68 
L. Ed. 131, 263 U.S. 1, held plaintiff could not recover 
for an injury due ''primarily'' to the failure of the de-
ceased to act. Frese was the ·engineer on a Burlington 
train which collided with a Wabash train at a crossing 
of the tracks on the same level. A statute of Illinois 
made it the duty of the engineer to stop within 800 feet 
and positively ascertain that the way is clear. The 
Wabash train. was approaching, (after both trains had 
stopped for the crossing) from the Burlington fireman's 
side of the ·engine and the plaintiff alleged negligence of 
the fireman. The court pointed out the statute made it 
the personal duty of the engineer to ascertain that it 
was safe to re·sume the course. 
"* * • Moreover, the statute makes it the 
personal duty of the engineer positively to ascer-
tain that the train can safely resume its course. 
Whatever may have been the practice, he could 
not escape this duty, and it would be a perver-
sion of the Employer's Liability Act (April 22, 
1908, chap. 149, Sec. 3, 35 Stat. at L. 65, 66, Comp. 
:Stat. Sec. 8659, 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1339) 
to hold that he could recover for an injury pri-
marily due to his failure to act as required on 
the ground that possibly the injury might have 
been prevented if his subordinate had done more. 
See Great North'ern R. Co. v. Wiles, 240 (4) U.S. 
444, 448. 60 L. Ed. 732, 734, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
406. * * *" 
While that case did not involve a violation of the 
Safety Appliance Act, the legal principle holding it was 
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proper to direct a verdict below for the defendant on 
the ground the negligence of the engineer was the sole 
proxilnate cause of his death clearly proves it was pro-
per for the court in the Coray case to submit the issue of 
causation to the jury. 
In .... -!·nna La,ng, adntx. r. New York Central Railroad 
Conz.pany, 65 L. Ed. 729, 255 U.S. 455, the action was 
lmder the Safety .. A.ppliance Act. The defendant had a 
defective car loaded with iron on the siding a:t the sta-
tion in Silver Creek, New York. The drawbar, the draft 
timber, and the coupling apparatus on the westerly end 
of this car were gone. This condition was known to the 
plaintiff's intestate prior to the accident. During a 
switching movement involving connecting three cars on 
the track where the crip·pled car stood, plaintiff'.s in-
testate was on one of these three cars for the pur·pose of 
setting the brakes and so placing them on this siding as 
not to come into contact with the crippled car. He 
went to the east end of the easterly car (on top) an,d 
his foot was resting on a small p1atform at the end of the 
car which is below the brake wheel. For ·.some reason 
he did not stop the three cars moving on this track 
before coming into contact with the crip~pled car. The 
cars collided and owing to the absence of coupler at-
tached on the crippled car, intestate's leg was caught 
between the ends of the two cars and he was so injured 
that he died. It was not the intention of any of the crev.r 
to disturb or couple or to move the crippled car. The 
defendant railroad contended and the Court held, that 
the proximate cause of the accident was the failure of the 
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deceased to stop the cars before they came into collision 
with the defective car, and that the absence of the 
coupler and drawbar was not a proximate cause or a 
concurring cans~. 
"It was the duty of the crew, we repeat, and 
immediately the duty of Lang, to stop the col-
liding car, and to set the brakes upon it 'so as 
not to come into contact with the crippled car,' 
to quote again from the trial court. That duty 
he failed to perform, and if it may be said that 
notwithstanding he would not have been injured 
if the car collided with had been equipped with 
drawbar and coupler, we answer, as the court of 
appeals answered: 'Still the collision was not the 
proximate result of the defect.' Or, in other 
words, and as expressed in effect in the Conarty 
Case, that the collision under the evidence can-
not be attributable to a violation of the provisions 
of the law, 'but only had they been complied 
with, it (the collision) would not have resulted in 
the injury to the deceased.' " 
In St. Louis & San Fr·ancisco Railroad Compainy v. 
Farl!liie M. Conarty, admx., 59 L. Ed. 1290, 238 U.S. 242, 
it ap·peared that the deceased was killed in a collision 
between a switch engine and a loaded freight car hav-
ing no coupling or drawbar at one end, these having been 
pulled out while the car was in transit. The car was 
about to be placed on an isolated track for repair. The 
deceased and two companions were ·standing on the 
foot board on the front of the switch engine, and when 
the car was observed, his com:p·anions stepped to the 
ground on either side of the track, while he remained 
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on the footboard and was caught between the engine and 
the car at the end fro1n 'vhich the coupler and drawbar 
w .. as missing. These appliances had they been in plac.e 
would have kept the engine and the body of the car 
sufficiently apart to have prevented the injury. The de-
ceased and his companions were not intending to and did 
not attempt to couple the defective car to the engine 
or handle it in any way. The court said that the princi-
pal question in the case was whether at the time he was 
injured the deceased was within the class of persons for 
whose benefit the Safety Appliance Act required auto-
matic couplers and drawbars. The court points out that 
the purpose of the act relating to drawbars and auto-
matic couplers is to enable the car to be coupled or un-
coupled ''without the necessity of men going between the 
ends of the cars." 
'' * * * Nothing in either provision gives any 
warrant for saying that they are intended to 
provide a place of safety between colliding cars. 
On the contrary, they affirmatively show that a 
principal purpose in their enactment was to ob-
viate 'the necessity for men going between the 
ends of the cars. ' 
''We are of the opinion that the deceased, 
who was not (251) endeavoring to couple or 
uncouple the car or to handle it in any way, but 
was riding on the colliding engine, was not in 
a situation where the absence of the prescribed 
coupler and drawbar operated as a breach of a 
duty imposed for his benefit, and that the :Su-
preme Court of the state erred in concluding that 
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the safety appliance acts required it to hold other-
wise.'' 
The Lang and Conarty cases arose under the Safety 
Appliance Act. They held the question of causation was 
one of law for the Court and resolved the question 
against the plaintiffs. It is the law of the Coray case 
that the question of causation is for the jury. Each of 
these cases supports our claim that the instructions of 
the trial court on causation were correct. 
In St. Louis, Iron Mou.ntain & Souther,n Railway v. 
McWhirter, 57 L. Ed. 1179, 229 U.S. 265, 33 S. Ct. 858, 
the deceased employee was killed by a slowly moving 
engine from which he dismounted to run ahead along 
the track to open th·e switch. He fell on the track. The 
accident happ,ened five minutes after the sixteen hours 
which employees are permitted to work under federal 
law had expired. The court of appeal·s held that the 
death of deceased must in part be attributed to the vio-
lation of the hours of service! act. 'The ·SupTeme Court 
of the United States reverse·d the ~as·e and held there 
J 
was no proof of proximate cause : 
'' . . . It requires no reasoning to demon-
strate that the general rule is· that, where negli-
gence is charged, to justify a recovery it must 'be 
shown that the alleged negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the damage. The character of evi-
dence necessary to prove such causation we need 
not point out, as it must depend upon the cir-
cumstances of each case. . . . '' 
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B. THE RULES OF DEFENDANT RELATING TO THE 
OPERATION OF TR .. \CI{ CARS WERE PROPERLY AD-
lVIITTED IN EVIDEN'CE UPON THE ISSUE OF SOLE PROX-
I~\LATE CA.USE . 
.... \.ppella.nt assigns error upon the ruling of the court 
permitting the defendant below to introduce in evi-
dence the rules of the railroad company relating to the 
operation of track cars. These rules are numbered 1112 
to 1119, a.nd 1120, and are found at page 136 of the 
transcript of the testimony. Rule 1112, provides that 
track cars \Yhen following a moving train ·shall remain 
not less than 400 feet to the rear of the same, and shall 
not stop within 200 feet of standing trains. Rule 1119, 
provides that track cars shall not be operated at a 
speed in excess of 15 m.p.h. Rule 1120, provides that 
operators of track cars must bear in mind that ap~proach­
ing trains may immediately enter a block even though 
that block is not occupied at the time, and that lineups 
obtained from train dispatchers cannot always be· de-
pended upon by reason of conditions unexpectedly chang-
Ing. 
The appellant tried the .case below on the theory 
that the i.ssue in the case upon the question of lia-. 
bility was one of sole proximate cause. That is the 
rule announced by the cases. All that the Supreme 
Court of the United States did in its decision in the Coray 
case was to put the question of proximate cause in the 
hands of the jury, an~d held that the trial court in the 
first trial was in error when it directed the verdict, and 
held that the question of causation was one of law ra-
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ther than one of fact. \\T e refer again to the language 
of that court in which it said: 
"The jury could have found that decedent's 
death resulted fron1 any or all of the foregoing 
cirrun1~tance~. '' 
It perhaps would not be useful to devote space to 
general definitions of the rule of proximate cause. As 
shown by the cases from the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in order for an act to be the proximate 
cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury wa.s 
a natural and probable consequence of the negligence or 
wrongful act, and it ought to have been foreseen in the 
light ~of ~a.ttending circumstances. This is the rnle which 
is quoted with ap1proval by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Brady vs. S'outhern Railway Compam;y, 
320 U. S. 476, 88 L. Ed. 239. The rule is quoted from an 
earlier case of Milw,aukee & St. P.R. Co. vs. Kellogg, 94 
U. S. 469, at 475, 24 L. Ed. 25;6, at 259: 
''But it is generally held, that, in order to 
warrant a finding that negligence, or an act not 
amounting to wanton wrong, is the proximate 
cause of an injury, it must ap·pear that the injury 
was the natural and probable consequence of the 
negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to 
have been foreseen in the light of the attending 
circumstances. 
''Events too remote to require reasonable 
·pre-vision need not be anticipated .... " 
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It is obvious that the rules of the co1npany relating 
to speed of track ears and the distance they must remain 
behind moving trains are facts which the jury is en-
titled to consider in detern1ining whether the running 
into the rear end of the stopped train "\Vas so unusual and 
s-o contrary to the results which would norm·ally and 
naturally follow from an emergency stop of a train when 
the airline became disconnected that the stop·ping was 
not the proximate cause of the death of Mr. Lucus. If 
·such testimony is not admissible to prove that the death 
of Lucus was not an event reasonably to be foreseen 
or anticipated because the train stop·p·ed on the track, 
it would likewise appear that all testimony with re-
spect to the facts relating to the accident itself would 
be immaterial. Certainly, there is equal reason for the 
court to hold tha~ the jury was entitled to have before 
them the rules of the company relating to the opera-
tion of track cars, as they were entitle·d to the testimony 
of the train crew respecting the ·o·p,eed at which the 
track car was moving, or the testimony of Mr. Lynch 
who was riding on the track car relating to all of the 
events which he described. That testimony was intro-
duced by the plaintiff. These rules were not introduced-
for the purpose of showing contributory ne_gligence 
or concurring negligence of Lucus, but to support an 
inference by the jury that the conduct of Lucus in run-
ning into the rear end of the train in broad daylight on 
a straight track was the sole proximate cause of his . 
death. The rules themselves merely state the human law 
of self-preservation. The jury was told specifically that 
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in this case contributory negligence was no defense and 
that the burden was on the defendant to prove that 
the negligence, if any, of Wm. Frank Lucus was the 
·.sold proximate cause of his death. ·The trial court gave 
to the jury instructions which state these issues upon 
proximate cause and contributory negligence in the lan-
guage requested by the defendant. In view of those 
instructions the jury must be assumed to have under-
stood the purpose of the rules was upon the issue of 
sole proximate cause. 
The Supreme Court in Great N otrthern Ry. C.o. v. 
Wiles, 60 L. Ed. 732, 240 U. S. 444, held there could be 
no recovery for the death of a brakeman on the caboose 
of a train which broke in two because the drawbar pulled 
out and stopped the train! instantly. Another train fol-
lowing ran into the caboose because the deceased failed 
to perform his duty to immediately put out signals to 
protect the stopped train as required by rule. 1The Min-
nesota court held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied 
from the pulling out of the drawbar and submitted the 
case to the jury on the theory of comparative negligence. 
''There is no room for the application of 
the rule of comparative negligenee established by 
the employer's liability act of April 22, 1908, 
(35 Stat. at L. 65, Chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1913, 
Sec. 8657), vvhere the rear brakeman of a parted 
freight train, disregarding his duty to protect the 
·rear of his train by going back a short distance 
and giving the warning signals which the car-
rier's rules required, remained in the caboose and 
was killed there when a passenger train, which 
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ing train, :since hi~ \Yas the causal negligence, 
eYen if negligence could be iinputed to the carrier 
fron1 the pulling out of the draw·bar which caused 
the train to break in t\YO, there being no claim 
that the passenger train \Vas negligently run.'' 
The failure of the dra\vbar in the Wiles case which 
permitted the train to break in two and come to an emer-
gency stop was a violation of the Safety Appliance A¢t 
just as was involved in the Coray case. The defendant ht-
troduced in evidence the rules of the railroad company 
\vhich required the deceased flagman under the circum-
stances must immediately go back with stop signals to 
warn approaching trains. The Supreme Court held that 
the violation of the rules was the sole p~roximate cause of 
the death of the flagman and that he could not recover. 
Helton v. Thompson, 36 N.E. (2d) 267, Appellate 
Court of Illinois, 1941. The facts and holding of the 
court are reflected in the headnotes. 
''Evidence held to establish that brakeman, in 
violation of dispatcher's orders and without in-
forming engineer or fireman, caused fireman and 
engineer to back train onto short and dangerous 
switch track rather than on track intended, caus-
ing train to be upset, and hence that brakeman'·s 
negligence was the sole and efficient cause of his 
death, p·recluding recovery therefor from rail-
road. Federal Employer's Liability Act. §§1-9, 
45 U.S.C.A. §§51-59. 
''In actions in state court against interstate 
railroad for death of employee, decisions under 
the Federal Employer's Liability Act are con-
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trolling. Federal Employer's Liability Act §§1-9, 
45 U.S.C.A. §§51-59. 
"Under Federal Employer's Liability Act, if 
sole proximate cause of plaintiff '·s injury or death 
resulted from his ·own conduct, it bars recovery. 
Federal Employer's Liability Act. §§ 1-9, 45 U.S. 
C.A. ~§51-59. 
''The rule that contributory negligence is no 
defense where negligence of injured railroad em-
ployee and some other employee combine to cause 
injury is inapplicable where injured employee 
violated company's orders and thus created a 
·dangerous ·situation for which he was solely re-
sponsible and for which there was no plausible 
explanation. Federal Employers' Liability Act 
§§1-9, 45 U. S. C. A. §§51-59.'' 
In the body of the opinion, the court stated and held: 
''The administrator and his counsel argue 
that the fireman and engineer were negligent in 
not slowing the train down more when Probert 
gave the slow signal by means of the lighted fusee, 
and in not stopping the train immediately when 
the 'washout' or emergency signal was given im-
mediately preceding the accident. While there 
may be some dispute as to the facts on this phase 
of the case decisions under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act, which are controlling in ~ases of 
this kind, are consistently to the effect that if 
the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury or 
death resulted from his own conduct, it bars re .. 
covery. In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wiles, 240 
U. S. 444, 36 :S. Ct. 406, 408, 60 L.. Ed. 732, a 
drawbar on a freight train came apart, and the 
train, while stopped, was hit by a; following pas-
senger train. Wiles was the rear brakeman on 
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the freight train, and it \vas his duty when it 
stopped to go back and flag, \vhich he failed to 
do, staying in the caboose 'vhere he was killed 
by the collision. The court denied recovery, say-
ing: ~There is no justification for a co1nparison 
of negligences or the ap·portioning of their effect. 
* * * ''Tiles kne'v them (the rule.s), and he was 
pron1pted to the performance of the duty they 
enjoined * * * by signals *· * *. He disregarded 
both. * * * He brought death to himself ·and to 
the conductor of his train.' In Davis v. Kennedy, 
266 U. S. 147, 45 S. Ct. 33, 69 L. Ed. 212, an en-
gineer was killed in· a collision of his train with 
another, west of a point known as Shops. The 
other train had the right of way, and the crew of 
Kennedy's train had instructions never to pass 
Shops unless they knew as a fact that the other 
train had passed it. Kennedy ran -his train past 
and beyond Shops and the collision occurred. 
Negligence of the other members of the crew was 
alleged but recovery was denied, and Mr. Justice 
Holmes, in commenting on the circumstances, said 
(266 U. S. at pages 148, 149, 45 S. Ct. at page 33, 
69 L. Ed. 212): 'It seems to us a perversion of the 
statute (the Employers Liability Act) to allow 
his representative to recover for an injury di-
rectly due to his failure to act as required on the 
ground that possibly it might have been pre-
vented if those in secondary relation to the move-
ment had done more.' In Unadilla Valley R. Co. 
v. Caldine, 278 U. S. 139, 49 S. Ct. ·91, 73 L. E~d. 
224, a conductor who had printed orders that his 
train was to pass the other at Bridgeport, in-
stead of waiting at Bridgeport, directed hi.s train 
to p;roceed, resulting; in a collision in which Cal-
dine, the conductor, was killed. Certain facts 
showing unusual conduct on the part of other em-
ployees were adduced in evidence, but the court 
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reversed judgrnent for plaintiff, saying (278 U. S. 
at page 142, 49 :S. Ct. at page 91, 73 L. Ed: 224) : 
'He cannot hold the Com·pany liable for a disaster 
that followed disobedience o£ a rule intended to 
prevent it, when the disobedience was broug~t 
about and intended to be brought about by his 
own acts.' 
"It is clear from the recor·d that Probert's 
negligence was the primary and in fact the sole 
and efficient cause of his death, and under the 
consistent rulings of the federal courts, many of 
which are cited in defendant's brief, recovery is 
barred under the act. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. 
v. Davis, 279 U. S. 34, 49 S. Ct. 210, 73 L. Ed. 601; 
Southern Railway Co. v .. Gray, 241 U. S. 333, 36 
S. Ct. 558, 60 L. Ed. 1030; .Southern Railroad Co. 
v. Youngblood, Adm'x, 286 U. S. 313, 52 S. Ct. 
518, 76 L. Ed. 1124; FTese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
Co., 263 U. S. 1, 3, 44 S. Ct. 1, 68 L. Ed. 131. '' 
The dispatcher's orders in Helton v. T'hompson are 
quite similar to the rules relating to track cars in the 
Lucus ca.se. The deceased Probert in the Helton case had 
received orders from the dispatcher to throw the switch 
and let the freight train back into the east passing track. 
Instead of doing this, he threw the switch and attempted 
to put the train on to the house track. The accident oc-
curred at four o'clock in the morning, and the fireman 
and the engineer were nearly one-third of a mile from 
where Probert was stationed. Probert first gave a stop 
signal, and then a back signal which the fireman gave 
to the engineer who acted upon it, and p·roceeded in 
a backward motion. The next was a slow ·signal, and 
finally a stop signal was given, followed by an emergency 
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signal called '',vashout," 'vhich n1eans stop at once. Pro-
bert had been standing on top of the rear car and when 
the firen1a.n 'vent back to the rear of the train, he found 
this car had tipped over the embankment, and Probert 
'vas found dead lying on the ground. It was at this time 
that the engineer learne·d for the first time that Probert 
had directed the train into the house track, instead of 
into the east passing track. There was a judgment on a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff below, which was reversed 
on appeal, the court holding that the trial court should 
have granted a directed verdict in favor ofi the defend-
ant. 
The reasoning applied by appellant in an attemp·t 
to show that the trial court committe'd error in permitting 
the rules of the company relating to track cars to be 
introduced as evidence would lead to some very strange 
conclusions. Since the rules are instructions of a superior 
to an employee, ap·pellant would apparently take the posi-
tion that it would be immate;rial to prove that Lucus took 
the track car out in ·direct violation of sp·ecific orders. 
That again under appellant's theory would merely be 
contributory negligence and would have no bearing upon 
sole proximate cause. Or presumably if Lynch, who was 
riding with Lucus on the track car, had observed the train 
after it went into an emergency stop and shouted at 
Lucus telling him the train had stopped and imploring 
him to stop the track car, and if Lucus had looked at the 
stopped train and then failed to ap~ply the brakes, I 
·,suppose it 'could be contented that his conduct in refus-
ing to stop the track car even though he observed the 
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train ahead of him was nothing more than contributory 
negligence, and the facts in that regard should not be 
admitted in evidence. The illustrations used differ in 
degree but not in ·principle from the facts at bar. Under 
the law of this case, it was the function of the jury to de-
cide whether under all the facts and circumstances rele-
vant and material to the question of proximate cause, 
the negligence of Lucus was the sole proximate cause. 
The cases from the :supreme Court of the United States 
which have ruled that the con.duct in those cases of the 
employee was the sole proximate cause as a matter of 
law of the injury or death involved are not overruled 
so far as the issue here involved is concerned. The Su-
preme Court of the United States has not held that the 
conduct of Lucus is merely contributory negligence. 
All the Supreme Court has held is that the question of 
causation is for the jury. The same evidence which 
proves the facts, and including the rules of the company 
relating to the conduct of the employee, are admissible 
and material whether the issue is one of law or one of 
fact. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri is frequently called 
upon to decide cases under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. Hamp'ton v. w.ab~ash R. C.o., 204 S. W. (2d) 708 
decided by that court on September 8, 1947, contains a 
lucid discussion of the legal principals involved in the 
Lucus case. Plaintiff's husban·d was killed by defend-
ant's passenger train. He was in charge of an extra 
gang engaged in repairing the track in a deep cut on a 
long curve. The banks of the cut were covered with trees. 
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The deceased and his nine men w~re working in the cut 
about 975 feet fro1n its west end when they 'vere run 
do"'"'ll by the defendant's eastbound train going seventy-
five miles an hour. He had placed a ''slow board'' at 
the side of the track about a mile west of where they were 
"~orking. Under the rules, this indica ted that the track 
one mile distant from the board was in .condition for a 
speed of not more than ten miles an hour except for 
first class train.s which did not have to reduce speed. 
The train involved in the accident was a first class train. 
The train was late. It normally went east through the 
cut a little before one o-'eloek. 
Under defendant's rules enginemen must sound the 
whistle approaching curves, and when the view is re-
stricted by weather or other unusual conditions. There 
was evidence that it was the practice to -soun·d the whistle 
all the way around curves in cuts for the protection of 
men who might be working on the :curve. There was 
evidence that the train involved did not sound a warn-
ing. Plaintiff charged that the written rules and custom 
were violated by defendant. 
Defendant's track supervisor had verbally instructed 
deceased not to operate the comp·re.ssor unless he had 
a watchman on the bank where he could see ap~roximately 
two miles. This instruction was violated by deceased, 
and defendant contends it was the primary and sole 
negligence, and that it was entitled to a directed verdict. 
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The court held that the negligence of the deceased 
''did not preclude a finding by the jury that his death 
was in part due to the negligence of the railroad's ser-
vants." 
This Hampton ~ase shows the propriety of the ad-
/ 
mission of the rules. The court held the negligence of 
the defendant's servants other than the plaintiff's de-
ceased husband was "a link in an unbroken chain of rea-
sonably foreseeable events.'' Brady v. Southern R. Co., 
320 U. S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232, 237, 88 L. Ed. 239. The rules 
of the defendant, Southern Pacific Company, in the 
Coray case were properly introduced to enable the jury 
to determine whether the failure of the triple valve was 
a link in an unbroken chain of reasonably foreseeable 
events. The question of proximate cause is not elimin-
ated in the case, because a violation of the safety ap-
p~liance law is involved. 
The court quoted the rule as follows: 
''We find in 35 Am. J ur., Master and Ser-
vant, :Sec. 407, the doctrine drawn from these 
United States Supreme Court cases stated as fol-
lows: 'In accord with the well-settled rule that 
there can he no recovery under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act where the negligence of 
the employee is the sole proximate cause of the 
injury, it is very generally held that where a vio-
lation of a regulation or instruction promulgated 
by the employer is the sole proximate cause of the 
injury, there can be no recovery under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act.' " 
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C. INSTRUCTION NUl\iBER 16 PROPERLY TOLD THE 
JURY THAT IF THE SOLE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF 
LUCUS WAS HIS OWN CONDUCT THE PLAINTIFF COULD 
NOT RECOVER. 
Appellant. assigns error because the court gave In-
struction No. 16 which is set out at page 210 of the rec-
ord. The appellant's exception to this instruction is 
found at page 145 of the Bill of Exceptions, and follows: 
''The plaintiff excepts to instruction number 
16 and each and every par- and portion thereof 
on the ground and for the reason that under said 
instruction the issue of contributory negligence 
was in fact submitted to the jury contrary to the 
Federal Safety Appliance Act and Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act.'' 
The exception to the instruction is general rather 
than specific. It does not point out or sp~ecify the p·art 
of the instruction to which objection is made to say that 
each and every part is objectionable. It adds nothing to 
a general exception to Instruction No. 16 to say that each 
and every part is objectionable. The reason for the ex-
ception does not sp·ecify the language to which objec-
tion is made. It is clearly established that in order for 
such an exception to raise any question for review in this 
court, the entire instruction must be erroneous. If the 
instruction contains sep-arate paragraphs or propositions 
which correctly state the law applicable to the case, the 
instruction is to be upheld in this court because the ex-
ception brings before this court only one question, to wit: 
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Was any "part or portion" of the instruction properly 
given by the trial court~ 
The last paragraph of Instruction No. 16 reads : 
"The burden is upon defendant to prove from 
a preponderance of the evidence that the negli-
gence, if any, of William Frank Lucus was the 
sole proximate cause of his death.'' 
There can be no question upon the correctness of this 
part of the inBtruction so that under the rule relating 
to general exceptions the assignment of error of appel-
lant on this point must be overruled. 
In Shortinoi v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 52 U. 476, 174 
P. 860, this court said: 
''Counsel for defendant excepted to twenty 
of the thirty-five paragraphs. The exception in-
variably read as follows: 'Defendant excepts to 
instruction No. ________ ,' stating the number of the 
paragraph excepted to. We have repeatedly held 
-indeed, we have so often decided it that it has 
become elementary-that unless the entire para-
graph is vulnerable such an exception presents 
nothing for review. As before stated, each para-
graph of the court's charge, with perhaps one or 
two exceptions, contained more than one legal pro-
position. A general exception to the whole para-
graph, therefore, may refer to any one of sev-
eral propositions contained in the paragraph. The 
purpose of taking an exception to an instruction 
is to direct the trial court's attention to the legal 
proposition which it is contended is faulty. The 
fault may lie in an omission, or in a \vord, a 
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phrase, or sentence, or in several sentences. While 
no reason need be assigned for the exception, yet 
if an alleged faulty staten1ent of law consists in 
a '""ord, phrase, or sentence, or in a series of sen-
tences, the excep1tion should be limited to such 
word, p~rase, sentence, or sentences, so that the 
trial court may examine them, and, if possible, 
c.orrec.t the error. If, therefore, an exception is 
to the "'"hole paragraph, it is a matter of mere 
conjecture what portion of the same is intended 
to be excepted to. Nor does such a general ex-
ception present anything to this court for review 
unless the "~hole paragraph excepted to is faulty, 
which is .seldom the case. In view, therefore, of 
the general nature of the exceptions, we cannot 
review the many errors assigned relating to the 
instructions.'' 
In Ryan v. Beaver Cournty, 82 U. 27, 21 P. (2d) 858, 
the court quotes with approval from the earlie·r Utah 
case of Farnsw-o.rth v. Union Facific Goal Co., 32 U. 112, 
89 P. 7 4, as follows : 
'' 'It is no longer an open question in this 
court, as it has often been held in common with 
most courts, that in taking exceptions the portion 
that is. exc.epted to must be p10inted out. A mere 
exception to an instruction is an exception in 
solido to the whole instruction, and, unless the 
whole instruction is bad, the exception is unavail-
ing for the purp·ose of having any particular part 
reviewe·d an·d passed upon by this court.' '' 
There was no prejudicial error in Instruction No. 
16. It told the jury that if the negligence of Lucus was 
the sole proximate cause of his death, then the verdict 
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must be for defendent no cause of action. The instruc-
' tion eontains three sentences. The first told the jury 
that where an employee has two ways of performing an 
act, the one safe and the other dangerous, he owes a 
duty to pursue the safe method, and -any departure will 
prevent recovery if he is injured. The next two sen-
tences told the jury that such conduct prevented re-
covery if it was the sole proximate cause, and that the 
burden of ·proof on the question of sole proximate cause 
was on the defendant. As pointed out elsewhere in this 
brief, the jury had been told that contributory negli-
gence was no defense, and that the defendant was guilty 
of a violation of the S-afety Appliance Act, and that if 
such violation proximately caused in whole or in part 
the death of Lucus, the verdict should be in favor of the 
plaintiff. Assuming, as we must on this appeal, that the 
jury construed the instructions together as an integrated 
whole, they could not have been misled by anything 
stated in No. 16. 
In Comeooe:s v. R.ailroad Co., 37. U. 475, 109 P. 10, 
this court held : 
, ''It will thus be observed that the court, while 
it did not charge the jury on the question of con-
tributory negligence in the instruction complained 
of, nevertheless did give other instructions in 
which it carefully guarded the rights of the de-
fendant, so far .as they were involved in that issue. 
It is a familiar rule of law that all the instructions 
must be read and considered together and if as a 
' ' whole, they contain a correct statement of the law 
applicable to the issues in a case, the court can-
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not be convieted of error because the la\v appli-
cable to the different questions involved is separ-
ately stated. In such case the instructions supple-
ment each other, and if, 'vhen read and considered 
as a series theY contain a correct statement of the 
la\Y, it is suffic&ient.'' • 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
REGARDING THE 1\IEASURE OF DAMAGES. 
Appellant states on page 40 of his brief: 
''The evidence :presented on the dependency 
and reasonable expectation of Mrs. Lucus for 
support from Frank Lucus demonstrated beyond 
any possible doubt that Frank Lucus did not at 
the time of his death intend to voluntarily sup-
port Mrs. Lucus. Reference to defendant's Ex-
hibit '2' will demonstrate that Mrs. Lucus did 
not believe that she could voluntarily get support 
from Frank Lucus. However, Mrs. Lucus had an 
adjudication of her right to support from Frank 
Lucus and that adjudication by the California 
Court continued in force to the date of Frank 
Lucus' death. * * * '' 
Apparently, appellant agrees with defendant that the ex-
pectation or right to be supported had become dissolved 
or had been replaced by a court judgment. The voluntary 
basis had disapp~eared. The statement that , "Frank 
Lucus did not at the time of his ·death intend to volun-
tarily support Mrs. Lucus'' is fully concurred in by 
appellee. We would go further and assert that the testi-
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mony would support a finding by the jury that Frank 
Lucus did not intend to pay Mrs. Lucus any of the $10.00 
a week ordered by the court as support money. He left 
Los Angeles for western Utah a short time after this 
II • 
order was signed by the court, on January 6, 1943. He 
was killed on May 24, 1944. He did not write or commun-
icate with Mrs. Lucus in -that interval of time. (Tr. 88-
89) She exhausted all the means at her command to 
learn where he was without success. The jury could find 
that he did not intend to pay her any money after Janu-
ary 6, 1943, but also that he was determined that her 
efforts if any to force him legally to pay her support 
money should not succeed. In her cross complaint for 
separate maintenance filed in the Superior Court for 
Los Angeles County, she had alle_ged: 
''V. That, although defendant has been a 
good and loving wife to the plaintiff, plaintiff 
has been guilty of extreme cruelty in his treat-
ment of defendant, causing her great mental pain, 
suffering and anguish. 
''VI. That plaintiff deserted and abandoned 
defendant more than a year prior to the com-
mencement of his action and lived separate and 
apart from the defendant against the will and 
wishes of the defendant; that during all of said 
time said plaintiff did not contribute anything 
· to the support of defendant and did not supply 
her with the necessities of life; that during the 
entire n1arried life of the parties the defendant 
has been forced to work to earn her livelihood 
and necessities of life; that plaintiff has always 
earned more than enough money to support de-
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fendant but has failed, neglected and refused 
so to do; all of \Yhich has been due to no fault of 
the defendant.'' 
,.,..... That plaintiff squanders his money on 
liquor, in bars and on friends and acquaintances 
\vith who1n he associates with at public drinking 
places, constantly drinking to excess. 
· '\~. That defendant has pleaded and 
begged plaintiff to give up his disreputable 
friends, to cease patronizing public bars and to 
return home and live with defendant; that plain-
tiff has persistently refused to do so; that due 
to his excessive drinking, plaintiff has become, 
in the past, involved in several grievous diffi-
culties, from which defendant was able to extri-
cate him only after great and costly effort; that 
due to plaintiff's conduct, defendant worries about 
him and is in constant ·dread that he will again 
become involved in difficulties ; that her worry 
has been so great that it has affected her health 
and she cannot sleep or rest properly, has lost 
her appetite and is almost physically exhausted; 
that she is in need of medical attention and can-
not afford to pay for it; that she.fears that she 
may have to quit her job because of her health; 
that unless she receive financial aid from plaintiff 
she will suffer to a great extent." 
She made "every effort possible" to get in touch 
with him after January 6, 1943, which was the day they 
had the hearing before the Judge, and she was granted 
$10.00 a week commencing February 1, 1943. 
Plaintiff's request No. 11 is not a correct statement 
of any legal principJe which would furnish a guide for 
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the jury. The first sentence told them the marriage rela-
tion creates a right on the part of the wife to be sup-
ported by her husband, and this right may be legally 
enforced by her so long as the marriage relation exists. 
Mrs. Lucus at the time of trial or at any other time since 
January 6, 1943, did not have the right to be supported 
by her husband. That right had been merged into a de-
cree in a divorce proceeding allowing her $10.00 a week 
until the further order of the court. The statement above 
might be proper in the normal relation of husband and 
wife living together if the husband is able to earn enough 
to support the wife and the wife is dependent. But the 
trial court very properly refused to instruct the jury 
that Mrs. Lucus had the right to ''support.'' Her ''right'' 
was limited to $10.00 a week. 
The second clause told the jury that if Edith B. 
Lucus is entitled to recover damages she can not he de-
prived of that right by a plea on the part of defendant 
that her husband had not fulfilled the duties he owed to 
her. This instruction if given would have led the jury to 
set up some standard of support which Lucus should 
have furnished his wife and based their verdict for 
damages on that standard without regard to whether 
Lucus had actually supported Mrs. Lucus. The request 
told the jury in effect that they should disregard the evi-
dence in the record that Lucus had ''failed'' and '' re-
fused'' to support Mrs. Lucus during the entire married 
life of the parties. This uncontradicted record of non-
support should be ignored, and they should ba.se their 
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Yerdict upon the '~duty'' of the husband to ''support.'' 
The instruction told the jury to disregard the evidence 
of past perforn1ance a.nd require the defendant to ful-
fill the duty of support 'Yhich Lucus did not discharge 
during his life. If the request means anything, that is 
'vhat it means. 
This request No. 11 is in conflict \vith appellant's 
request No. 10. Request No. 10 'Yas given as instruction 
No. 11 as requested. In it the jury was pro·perly in-
structed that the measure of damages was ''the lo-ss ·of 
perm,niary benefits which she might reasonably have ex-
pected to receive from the s·aid deceased during her life-
ti·n1-e if the said deceased had not been killed.'' And in 
another paragraph of the same instruction requested hy 
appellant, the measure is stated as ''the present cash 
value of the estimated future contributions toward her 
support which she could reasonably have expected from 
the deceased during her lifetime had he not been killed.'' 
Reasonable expectation of future p~ecuniary support 
or contributions is entirely different from telling the 
jury to decide what the deceased owed as a duty and 
then disregard his past record of non-support and give 
a verdict imposing the non..:performed duty of Lucus 
on the Southern Pacific Company. 
Appellant's request No. 11 told the jury that in 
determining the loss of pecuniary benefits, they may take 
into consideration not only such voluntary contributions 
as Lucus may reasonably have been expected to make, 
but also such contributions as she may reasonably have 
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been expected to secure through the enforcement of her 
legal right to support from the husband. 
In vie·w of the fact that Instruction No. 10 spoke of 
"pecuniary benefits" and "estimated future contribu-
tions" it included in its general terms both "voluntary" 
and ''involuntary'' contributions. Instruction No. 10 
covered the field fully and correctly. 
There was no evidence in the record from which 
the jury could find specifically that Mrs. Lucus would 
obtain "involuntary" contributions from Lucus through 
the enforcement of her legal right to support. Her right 
to ''support'' had been exchanged by court order for 
$10.00 a week. She exhausted her means of learning 
where he was shortly after January 6, 1943, when he left 
Los Angeles. :She never heard from him after that date. 
She discontinued her ·search. A finding she would have 
located him and forced him to support her would have 
_been contrary to all the evidence in the record on the 
point. Mrs. Lucus did not testify she had any intention 
of prutting the law on Lucus and forcing him to pay her 
the $10.00 a week. At page 88 of the transcript, she 
said she made every effort possible to get in touch with 
her husband. She was very much distressed. ''I didn't 
know where he was and was worried about him.'' She 
inquired at the draft board, and the navy recruiting office 
and his former employer, and wrote to him at his 
mother's home, but the letter came back. She thought 
eventually her husband would return to her. She main-
tained the home and thought if he had been alive he 
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"·ould be there \Yith her today. She "ras positive he 
\Yould return to her son1e day. 
If this testimony is entitled to_ any weight, it proves 
she 'was not going to enforce her legal rights to $10.00 
a week, but she was going to maintain the home with 
full assurance he would return some day (before trial) 
and voluntarily resume the marriage relation and volun-
tarily contribute. While the testimony on this question on 
involuntary contributions is very meager, it proves Mrs. 
Lucas had no intention of forcing Lucus to pay. She is 
the only person who knew her own mind, and the record 
shows it was her intention to rest on her ''positive" 
conviction he would return to live with her. 
Appellant objects to Instruction No. 9, which pro-
vided: 
'' 'You are instructed that the mere fact that 
Edith Lucus was the legal wife of Frank, Lucus 
at the time of his death is not sufficient evidence 
to prove that plaintiff is entitled to recover any 
damages for his death in this action. If you be-
lieve from all the evidence in the case, that the 
deceased would not have made any further money 
contributions to Edith Lucus or would not have 
supported her in the future if he had not died, 
then your verdict should he for the defendant.' " 
This instruction was just the converse of Instruction 
No. 11 that the measure of damages was the reasonable 
expectation of future contributions. It follows as a logi-
cal and necessary corollary from the rule of damages 
in appellant's request No. 10 given as Instruction No. 11. 
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Appellant does not refer us to any law, which holds that 
the mere fact that Edith Lucus was the legal wife of 
Frank Lucus entitled plaintiff to recover damages for 
his death. Neither are we referred to any law which 
holds that it was error to instruct the jury that if they 
believed the deceased would not have made any further 
money contributions to Mrs. Lucus if he lived, their 
verdict should be for the defendant. The cases cited by 
appellant hold that defendant is not entitled to a directed 
verdict on the question of damages where a wife or a 
wife and minor child are plaintiffs even though there 
was a failure of support prior to death. But it is un-
necessary to decide whether the plaintiff below made 
a jury issue upon damages. The issue of damages was 
submitted to the jury under the instruction drawn and 
requested by appellant that the measure of damage was 
the present cash value of estimated future contribu-
tions toward her support which she could have reason-
ably expected from the deceased had he not been killed. 
This includes all contributions, voluntary and involun-
tary. 
Ap·pellant relies upon Gilliam v. Southern Ry. Co., 
93 S.E. 865 (So. Carolina, 1917). We believe that case 
is authority supportin_g the refusal of the trial court in 
the Coray case to give the plaintiff's requested instruc-
tion on involuntary contributions. Plaintiff had judgment 
below for the death of Whit McBride who left a wife and 
minor child. He married the woman sixteen or eighteen 
years before, and after living with her about a year he 
abandoned her and his child. There was no evidence 
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that he after"~ards contributed anything to the support 
of either of then1, nor \Yas there any evidence that he 
did not. There was evidence that after he abandoned her, 
his wife lived in the house with another man and that she 
had another child. The defendant moved for a directed 
verdict which was denied and there was a verdict for 
plaintiff, and an appeal by defendant. _The court held 
that the motion for directed verdict on the ground that 
the woman and child sustained no actual pe:cuniary loss 
by the death of McBride was properly denied, because 
prima facie and presumptively the widow and minor 
unmarried child of deceased had a legal pecuniary inter-
est in the continuance of his life. The portion of the opin-
ion quoted in appellant's brief holds that th~ defendant 
in the Coray case was not entitled. to a directed verdict 
on the question of damages. Since the is-sue of damages 
was submitted to the jury, we submit that the quotation, 
while interesting and instructive is beside any real issue 
in this case. But note the following language of the case: 
"It follows, however, that, although the tech-
nical right may exist, yet the deprivation of it 
may .cause very little, or, possibly, no actual finan-
cial loss, for it may be shown from the relation, 
circumstances, and relative condition of deceased 
and the surviving relatives for whose benefit the 
action is brought that ~no actual pecuniary los·s, 
present or prospective, resulted to them from his 
death; and it is well settled that it is only for such 
loss that recovery may he had. Michigan Central 
R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 5'9, 33 Sup. Ct. 192, 
57 L. Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 17 6 ; American 
R. Co. v. Didrickson, 227 U. S. 145, 33 Sup. Ct. 
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224, 57 L. Ed. 456; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. McGinnis, 
228 U. S. 173, 33 Sup. Ct. 426, 57 L. Ed. 785 .; St. 
Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35 
Sup. Ct. 704, 59 L. Ed. 1160, or as in the McGinnis 
case, it may appear that some of them sustained 
such loss while others did not. Therefore, in view 
of the evidence tending to show that the wife had 
forfeited her right of support, the court should 
have _given defendant's first request, to wit.~ 
'I charge you the measure of damages 
is the amount which will compensate the sur-
viving beneficiaries for the actual pecuniary 
loss, and the jury should apportion the 
amount among them according to the loss 
of each.' 
''In this connection, we consider the assign-
ment of error in charging plaintiff's fourth re-
quest, to wit: 
'That the law of this state imposes upon 
a man the duty of supporting his wife and 
children, and in the absence of other proof 
it will be presumed that-everybody obeys the 
law of the land until the contrary appears.' 
''While that is a sound p-roposition of law, 
and is applicable when there is no evidence upon 
the question _ whether the duty has been per-
formed, or when the evidence upon that issue is 
conflicting, yet, in view of the undisputed evi-
dence in this case that deceased had not supported 
his wife and child, this instruction might have 
been misleading, for the jury might have under-
stood it as -authorizing an award of damages for 
the loss -of sup:port, presumed to have been fur-
nished, when, in fact, it had not been furnished. 
Under the evidence, recovery, if at all should 
have been limited to the prospective lo~s which 
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the "~ido'v and daughter actually sustained by 
reason of the deprivation of their right of sup-
port as heretofore explained.'' 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff had a fair trial and the jury returned a 
verdict of no cause of action. Th·e verdict is supported 
by the testimony in the record on the gro11nd that the 
failure of the air line and the stop·ping of the train was 
not the proximate cause of the death of Lucus. The ver-
dict also finds support in the testimony that Mrs. Lucus 
sustained no pecuniary loss when Mr. Lucus was killed. 
Reading all the instructions together, the jury was p·ro-
perly instructed and there was no error in the admis-· 
. sion of testimony. 
The judgment below upon the verdict should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendamt and 
Respondent. 
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